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Abstract
We study equilibrium in hedonic markets, when consumers and suppli-
ers have reservation utilities, and the utility functions are separable with
respect to price. There is one indivisible good, which comes in different
qualities; each consumer buys 0 or 1 unit, and each supplier sells 0 or 1
unit. Consumer types, supplier types and qualities can be either discrete
of continuous, in which case they are allowed to be multidimensional.
Prices play a double role: they keep some agents out of the market, and
they match the remaining ones pairwise. We define equilibrium prices and
equilibrium distributions, and we prove that equilibria exist, we investi-
gate to what extend equilibrium prices and distributions are unique, and
we prove that equilibria are efficient. In the particular case when there
is a continuum of types, and a generalized Spence-Mirrlees condition is
satisfied, we prove the existence of a pure equilibrium, where demand dis-
tributions are in fact demand functions, and we show to what extent it is
unique. The proofs rely on convex analysis, and care has been given to
illustrate the theory with examples.
1 Introduction.
1.1 Main results.
In this paper, we show the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium in a hedonic
market, and we give uniqueness results. The main features of our model are as
follows:
• There is a single, indivisible, good in the market, and it comes in different
qualities z
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• Consumers and producers are price-takers and utility-maximizers. They
are characterized by the values of some variables; each set of values is
called a (multidimensional) type.
• Consumers buy at most one unit of the good, and they buy none if their
reservation utility is not met; producers supply at most one unit of the
good, and they supply none if their reservation utility is not met. In other
words, agents always have the option of staying out of the market.
• The utilities of consumers and of producers are quasi-linear with respect
to price: the utility consumers with type x derive from buying one unit of
quality z at price p (z) is u (x, z)−p (z), and the utility producers with type
y derive from selling one unit of quality z at price p (z) is p (z)− v (y, z)
Our results are valid in the discrete case and in the continuous case. We
show that there is a (nonlinear) price system p (z) such that, for every quality
z, the number (or the aggregate mass) of consumers who demand z is equal to
the number (or the aggregate mass) of suppliers who produce z. In addition,
agents who are staying out of the market are doing so because by entering they
would lower their utility. In other words this price system exactly matches a
subset of consumers with a subset of producers, and the remaining consumers
or producers are priced out of the market. This is called an equilibrium price,
and the resulting allocation of qualities is called an equilibrium allocation. An
example is given in section 4.4, and the reader may proceed there directly. We
should stress, however, that we prove existence in full generality, beyond the
one-dimensional situation described in that example.
Every price system p (z) creates a matching between consumers and produc-
ers: for every unit traded, there is a pair consisting of a consumer who buys
it and a producer who sells it. When summing their utilities, the price of the
traded item cancels out, so that the resulting utility of the pair is independent
of the price system. Unmatched consumers and producers (singles) get their
reservation utility. It is then meaningful to take the social planner’s point of
view, and to ask for a matching between consumers and producers which will
maximize aggregate utility, where the utility of matched pairs is the maximum
utility they can get by trading, and the utility of unmatched agents is their
reservation utility. We will show that the solution of this problem coincides
with the equilibrium matching. This implies that every equilibrium is efficient.
An interesting feature of equilibrium pricing is that, even tough all techno-
logically feasible qualities are priced, not all of them will be traded in equilib-
rium. For each non-traded quality, there is a non-empty bid-ask range: all prices
which fall within that range are equilibrium prices, that is, they will not lure
customers or suppliers away from traded qualities. This means that equilibrium
prices cannot be uniquely defined on non-traded qualities. On the other hand,
they are uniquely defined on traded qualities. There is a corresponding degree
of uniqueness for the equilibrium allocation.
The main drawback of our model is the assumption that utilities are quasi-
linear. It is quite a restriction, from the economic point of view, since it means
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that the marginal utility of money is constant, but our proof seems to require
it in an essential way. On the other hand, it also enables us to prove some
uniqueness results, which are probably not to be expected in the more general
case.
1.2 The litterature.
This paper inherits from two traditions in economics. On the one hand, it can
be seen as a contribution to the research program on hedonic pricing that was
outlined by Shervin Rosen in his seminal paper [16]. The idea of defining a
good as a bundle of attributes (originating perhaps with Houthakker [9], and
developed by Lancaster [11], Becker [1] and Muth [12]), provides a systematic
framework for the economic analysis of the supply and demand for quality. The
main direction of investigation, however, has been towards econometric issues,
such as the construction of price indices net of changes in quality; see for instance
the seminal work of Court [3] and the book [8]). The identification of hedonic
models raises specific questions which have been first discussed by Rosen [16],
and most recently by Ekeland, Heckman and Nesheim [4]. Theoretical question,
such as the existence and characterization of equilibria, have attracted less at-
tention. The papers by Rosen [16] and later Mussa and Rosen [14] study the
one-dimensional situation, that is, the case when agents are fully characterized
by the value of a single parameter. The multidimensional situation has been
investigated by Rochet and Chone´ [15], but it deals with monopoly pricing.
The issue of equilibrium pricing in the multidimensional situation, had to my
knowledge not been adressed up to now (nor, for that matter, has the issue of
oligopoly pricing).
One of Rosen’s main achievement has been to recognize hedonic pricing as
nonlinear, against the prevailing tradition in econometric usage. As noted in
[16], a buyer can force prices to be linear with respect to quality if certain types
of arbitrage are allowed. In the present paper, buyers and sellers are restricted
to trading one unit of a single quality, and there is no second-hand market, so
this kind of arbitrage is unavailable, and prices will be inherently nonlinear.
This would not be the case if consumers and producers were allowed to buy and
sell several qualities simultaneously.
On the other hand, this paper also belongs to the tradition of assignment
problems. This tradition has several strands, one of which originates with Koop-
mans and Beckmann [10], and the other with Shapley and Shubik [17]. We refer
to the papers by Gretzki, Ostroy and Zame [6] and [7], and to [13] for more
recent work. In this literature, producers are not free to choose the quality they
sell: each quality is associated with a single producer, who can produce that
one and not any other one. The Shapley-Shubik model, for instance, describes
a market for houses. There are a certain number of sellers, each one is endowed
with a house, and a certain number of buyers. No seller can sell a house other
than his own, but a buyer can buy any house. This is in contrast with the
situation in the present paper, where both buyers and sellers are free to choose
the quality they buy or sell.
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1.3 Structure of the paper
Section 2 describes the mathematical model and the basic assumptions. As we
mentioned earlier, we do not require that the distribution of types be continuous,
nor that the number of consumers equals the number of producers. Mathemat-
ically speaking, there is a positive measure µ on the set of consumer types X ,
and a measure ν on the set of producer types Y , both µ and ν can have atoms,
and typically µ (X) 6= ν (Y ). These features, although very appealing from
the point of view of economic modelling, introduce great complications in the
mathematical treatment. In earlier work [5], the author has given a streamlined
proof in the particular case when µ and ν are non-atomic, µ (X) = ν (Y ) and an
additional sorting assumption on utilities is satisfied (extending to multidimen-
sional types the classical Spence-Mirrlees single-crossing assumption), so that
all agents with the same type do the same thing. Beside the fact that it does
not apply when X or Y are finite, such a model does not capture one of the
essential role of prices, which serve not only to match consumers and producers
which enter the market (there must necessarily be an equal number of both)
but also to keep out of the market enough agents so that matching becomes
possible. The latter function is an essential focus of the present paper.
In our model, there is a single indivisible good, consumers are restricted to
buying one or zero unit, and producers are restricted to supply one or zero unit.
The price is a nonlinear function p (z) of the quality z. It is an equilibrium price
if the market for every quality clears. This implies that the number of consumers
who trade is equal to the number of suppliers who trade. The remaining, non-
trading, agents, are kept out of the market by the price system, which is either
too high (for consumers) or too low (for producer) to allow them to make more
than their reservation utility.
It is important to note that in equilibrium consumers (or producers) which
have the same type may not be doing the same thing. This will typically occur
when utility maximisation does not result in a single quality being selected.
To be precise, given an equilibrium price p (z), consumers of type x maximize
u (x, z)− p (z) with respect to z. But there is no reason why there should be a
unique optimal quality: even if we assumed u (x, z) to be strictly concave with
respect to z, the price p (z) typically is nonlinear with respect to z, and no
conclusion can be derived about uniqueness.
If p (z) is an equilibrium price, and if there is a non-trivial subset D (x) ⊂ Z
such that any z ∈ D (x) is a utility mazimizer for x, there will be a certain
equilibrium probability Pαx on D (x). This means that, given A ⊂ D (x) , the
number Pαx [A] ∈ [0, 1] is the proportion of agents of type x whose demands lie
in A. Similarly, there will be an equilibrium probability P βy for every producer
y, and the resulting demand and supply for every quality z will balance out. A
formal definition is given in section 3. In other words, in equilibrium, we cannot
tell which agent of a given type does what, but we can tell how many of them
do this or that.
The main results of the paper, together with the definition of equilibrium,
are stated in section 3: equilibria exist, equilibrium prices are not unique, there
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is a unique equilibrium allocation, and it is efficient (Pareto optimal). Proofs
are deferred to Appendices C and D. These proofs combine two mathematical
ingredients, the Hahn-Banach separation theorem on the one hand, and duality
techniques which extend the classical Fenchel duality for convex functions, and
which have been developed in the context of optimal transportation (see [18] for
a recent survey). Everything relies in studying a certain optimization problem
(33), which is novel.
Section 4 gives additional assumptions which ensure that all agents of the
same type do the same thing in equilibrium: µ and ν should be non-atomic,
and conditions (9) and (10) should be satisfied. These conditions extend to
multidimensional types the classical single-crossing assumption of Spence and
Mirrlees. The resulting equilibria are called pure, in reference to pure and mixed
equilibria in game theory. Note however that, even in this case, one cannot fully
determine the behaviour of agents in equilibrium: if consumers of type x are
indifferent between entering the market or not (either decision giving them their
reservation utility), then, even with these additional assumptions, we cannot say
which ones will stay out and which ones will come in. The equilibrium relations
will only determine the proportion of each.
Subsection 4.4 describes an explicit example. It is strictly one-dimensional
(types and qualities are real numbers), which makes calculations possible, and a
complete description of the equilibrium is provided. Unfortunately, the method
uses does not extend to multidimensional types.
Appendix A gives the mathematical results on u-convex and v-concave anal-
ysis which will be in constant use in the text. Appendix B gives general mathe-
matical notations, and references about Radon measures. Appendices C and D
contain proofs.
2 The model.
2.1 Standing assumptions.
Let X ⊂ Rd1 , Y ⊂ Rd2 , and Z0 ⊂ R
d3 be compact subsets. We are given non-
negative finite measures µ on X and ν on Y. They are allowed to have point
masses.
Typically, we will have µ (X) 6= ν (Y ).
Let Ω1 be a neighbourhood of X×Z0 in R
d1+d3 , and Ω2 be a neighbourhood
of Y × Z0 in R
d2+d3
. We are given continuous functions u : Ω1 → R and
v : Ω2 → R. It is assumed that u is differentiable with respect to x, and that
the derivative:
Dxu =
(
∂u
∂x1
, ...,
∂u
∂xd1
)
is continuous with respect to (x, z). Similarly it is assumed that v is differen-
tiable with respect to y, and that the derivative Dyv is continuous with respect
to (y, z).
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Note that X,Y and/or Z0 are allowed to be finite. If X is finite, the as-
sumption on u is satisfied. If Y is finite, the assumption on v is satisfied.
2.2 Bid and ask prices
We are describing the market for a quality good: it is indivisible, and units differ
by their characteristics (z1, ..., zd3) ∈ Z0. The bundle z = (z1, ..., zd3) will be
referred to as a (multidimensional) quality. So Z0 is the set of all technologi-
cally feasible qualities; it is to be expected that they will not all be traded in
equilibrium.
Points in X represent consumer types, points in Y represent producer types.
If X is finite, then µ (x) is the number of consumers of type x. If Y is finite,
then ν (y) is the number of producers of type y. If X is infinite, then µ is the
distribution of types in the consumer population, and the same interpretation
holds for (Y, ν).
Each consumer buys zero or one unit, and each supplier sells zero or one
unit. There is no second-hand trade.
For the time being, we define a price system to be a continuous map p :
Z0 → R. This definition will be modified in a moment, as the set Z0 will be
extended to a larger set Z. Typically, pricing is nonlinear with respect to the
characteristics. Once the price system is announced, agents make their decisions
according to the following rules:
• Consumers of type x maximize u (x, z)−p (z) over Z0. If the value of that
maximum is strictly positive, the consumer enters the market and buys
one unit of the maximizing quality z. If there are several maximizing
qualities, he is indifferent between them, and the way he chooses which
one to buy is not specified at this stage. If the value of the maximum is
0, he is indifferent between staying out of the market, and entering it to
buy one unit of the maximizing quality. Again, the way he chooses is not
specified at this stage.
• Producers of type y maximize p (z)− v (y, z) over Z0. If the value of that
maximum is strictly positive, the producer enters the market and sells one
unit of the maximizing quality z. If there are several maximizing qualities,
he is indifferent between them. If the value of the maximum is 0, he is
indifferent between staying out of the market, and entering it to sell one
unit of the maximizing quality.
To model this procedure by a straigthforward maximization, we introduce
two extra points ∅d /∈ Z0 and ∅s /∈ Z0, with ∅d 6= ∅s, and we extend utilities
and prices as follows:
p (∅d) = u (x,∅d) = 0 ∀x ∈ X (1)
p (∅s) = v (y,∅s) = 0 ∀y ∈ Y (2)
u (x,∅s) = −1 , v (y,∅d) = 1 (3)
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The set of possible decisions for agents is now
Z = Z0 ∪ {∅d} ∪ {∅s}
so that:
max {u (x, z)− p (z) | z ∈ Z} ≥ u (x,∅d)− p (∅d) = 0
max {p (z)− v (y, z) | z ∈ Z} ≥ p (∅s)− v (y,∅s) = 0
and the procedure we just described amounts to maximizing over Z instead of
Z0. The relations (1) to (3) imply that consumers will never choose ∅s (it is
always better to choose ∅d), and producers will never choose ∅d (it is always
better to choose ∅s). So our model does capture the intended behaviour.
Note that we have normalized reservation utilities to 0. This does not cause
any loss of generality. The behaviour of consumers, for instance, is fully specified
by u (x, z) and u¯ (x), the latter being the reservation utility, and we get the
same behaviour by replacing u (x, z) by u (x, z)− u¯ (x) and u¯ (x) by 0, the only
restriction being that we would require u¯ to be C1, to preserve the regularity
properties of u.
Normalizing reservation utilities to 0, we find that u (x, z) is the bid price
for quality z by consumers of type x, that is, the highest price that they are
willing to pay for that quality. Similarly, v (y, z) is the asking price for quality
z by producers of type y , that is, the lowest price they are willing to accept for
supplying that quality. For a given quality z ∈ Z, it is natural to consider the
highest bid price from consumers and the lowest ask price from producers:
Definition 1 The highest bid price b : Z → R is given by:
b (z) = max
x
u (x, z)
and the lowest ask price a : Z → R is given by:
a (z) = min
y
v (y, z)
Note that b (∅d) = a (∅s) = 0 and that a (∅d) = −b (∅s) = 1.
It follows from their definitions that b is u-convex and a is v-concave. More
precisely, we have b (z) = 0♯x and a (z) = 0
♭
y where 0x and 0y denote the maps
x→ 0 and y → 0 on X and Y . Conversely, we have 0 = maxz {u (x, z)− b (z)}
and 0 = minz {v (y, z)− a (z)}, so that b
♯ (x) = 0 and a♭ (y) = 0.
Note that if the price system is such that p (z) > b (z) for some quality z,
then there will be no buyers for this quality, and so it cannot be traded at that
price. Similarly, if p (z) < a (z), then there will be no sellers for this quality,
and it cannot be traded at that price. The following is obvious:
Proposition 2 (No-trade equilibrium) If a (z) > b (z) everywhere, then all
consumers and all producers stay out of the market.
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2.3 Demand and supply
From now on, a price system will be a continuous map p : Z → R such that
p (∅d) = p (∅s) = 0.
Given a price system p, the map p : Z → R is continuous and the set Z is
compact, so that the functions u (x, z) − p (z) and p (z) − v (y, z) attain their
maximum on Z.
Definition 3 Given a price system p, we define:
D (x) = argmax {u (x, z)− p (z) | z ∈ Z}
S (y) = argmin {v (y, z)− p (z) | z ∈ Z}
Both are compact and non-empty subsets of Z. We shall refer to D (x) as the
demand of type x consumers, and to S (y) as the supply of type y producers.
It follows from the definitions that if a consumer of type x is out of the
market, then we must have ∅d ∈ D (x) . If there is no other point in D (x), then
all consumers of the same type stay out of the market. If, on the other hand,
D (x) contains some point z ∈ Z0, then all consumers of type x are indifferent
between staying out or buying quality z, and we may expect that some of them
actually buy quality z instead of staying out. This remark will be at the core of
our equilibrium analysis. Of course, the same observation is valid for producers.
The following result clarifies the relation between D (x) and S (y) on the one
hand, and the sub- and supergradients ∂p♯ (x) and ∂p♭ (y) on the other. Recall
that:
p♯ (x) = max {u (x, z)− p (z) | z ∈ Z}
p♭ (y) = min {v (y, z)− p (z) | z ∈ Z}
Proposition 4 We have D (x) ⊂ ∂p♯ (x) and S (y) ⊂ ∂p♭ (y). More precisely:
D (x) =
{
z ∈ ∂p♯ (x) | p (z) = p♯♯ (z)
}
S (y) =
{
z ∈ ∂p♭ (y) | p (z) = p♭♭ (z)
}
Proof. The point x ∈ X being fixed, consider the functions ϕ : Z → R
and ψ : Z → R defined by ϕ (z) = u (x, z)− p (z) and ψ (z) = u (x, z)− p♯♯ (z).
The subgradient ∂p♯ (x) is the set of points z where ψ attains its maximum (see
appendix A), while D (x) is the set of points z where ϕ attains its maximum.
But ψ ≥ ϕ and maxψ = maxϕ. The result follows.
Definition 5 Given a price system p (z), consumers of type x are inactive if
p♯ (x) < 0, so that D (x) = {∅d}, and they are active if p
♯ (x) > 0, so that
{∅d} /∈ D (x). They are indifferent if p
♯ (x) = 0, so that D (x) ⊃ {∅d}∪{z} for
some z ∈ Z0. Similarly, producers of type y are inactive, active or indifferent
according to whether p♭ (y) is positive, negative or zero.
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2.4 Admissible price systems
We have seen that, if a (z) > b (z) everywhere, there is a no-trade equilibrium.
We are concerned with the more interesting case when a (z) ≤ b (z) for some z.
Definition 6 Quality z ∈ Z is marketable if a (z) ≤ b (z). The set of mar-
ketable qualities will be denoted by Z1 :
Z1 = {z ∈ Z | a (z) ≤ b (z)}
= {z ∈ Z | ∃x , ∃ y : v (y, z) ≤ u (x, z)}
Note that staying out is not a marketable option: a (∅d) > b (∅d) and
a (∅s) > b (∅s). As mentioned earlier, this means that consumers will never
choose ∅s and that suppliers will never choose ∅d. We have therefore the
inclusions:
Z1 ⊂ Z0  Z
If a quality z is not marketable, one will never be able to find a buyer/seller
pair that trade z. If a quality z is marketable, there is no sense in setting its price
to be higher than b (z) (there would be no buyers), or lower than a (z) (there
would be no sellers). Hence:
Definition 7 A price system p : Z → R will be called admissible if:
∀z ∈ Z1, a (z) ≤ p (z) ≤ b (z)
Let p be an admissible price system, so that a (z) ≤ p (z) ≤ b (z). Recall
that p♯ (x) is the indirect utility of type x consumers, and that −p♭ (y) is the
indirect utility of type y producers. Taking conjugates, we get:
∀x ∈ X, 0 ≤ p♯ (x)
∀y ∈ Y, 0 ≥ p♭ (y)
which means that all consumers and producers achieve at least their reservation
utility.
3 Equilibrium
3.1 Demand distribution and supply distribution
Assume a price system p : Z → R is given. Let D (x) and S (y) be the associated
demand and supply. Recall. that their graphs are compact sets.
We refer to Appendix B for notations and definitions concerning Radon
measures and probabilities.
Definition 8 A demand distribution associated with p is a positive measure
αX×Z on X × Z such that:
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• αX×Z is carried by the graph of D
• its marginal αX is equal to µ
Similarly, a supply distribution associated with p is a positive measure βY×Z
on Y × Z such that:
• βY×Z is carried by the graph of S
• its marginal βY is equal to ν
The conditional probabilities Pαx and P
β
y then are carried by D (x) and
S (y) respectively. Given A ⊂ Z, the numbers Pαx [A] and P
β
y [A] are readily
interpreted as the probability that consumers of type x demand some z ∈ A
and the probability that producers of type y supply some z ∈ A.
If S (y) is a singleton, so that the supply of type y producers is uniquely
defined, then P βy reduces to a Dirac mass:
S (y) = {s (y)} =⇒ P βy = δs(y)
and similarly for consumers.
3.2 Definition of equilibrium
Definition 9 An equilibrium is a triplet (p, αX×Z , βY×Z), where p is an ad-
missible price system and αX×Z and βY×Z are demand and supply distributions
associated with p, such that:
αZ0 = βZ0
By αZ0 and βZ0 we denote the marginals of αX×Z and βY×Z on Z0. Let us
write down explicitly all the conditions on (p, α, β) implied by this definition:
1. p : Z → R is continuous, and p (z) ∈ [a (z) , b (z)] whenever a (z) ≤ b (z)
2. the marginal αX is equal to µ
3. the conditional probability Pαx is carried by D (x)
4. the marginal βY is equal to ν
5. the conditional probability P βy is carried by S (y)
6. the marginals αZ and βZ coincide on Z0:
αZ [A] = βZ [A] ∀A ⊂ Z0
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The interpretation is as follows. Given p, consumers of type x maximize
their utility, thereby defining their individual demand set D (x). If that set is a
singleton, D (x) = {d (x)}, the probability Pαx must be the Dirac mass carried
by d (x), and all consumers of type x do the same thing: they stay out of the
market if d (x) = ∅d, and they buy z ∈ Z0 if d (x) = z. If D (x) contains several
points, then consumers of type x are indifferent among these alternatives, and
they all do different things. For any Borel subset A ⊂ D (x), the probability
Pαx [A] gives us the proportion of consumers of type x who choose some z ∈ A
in equilibrium.
Similar considerations hold for suppliers. Condition 6 just states that mar-
kets clear in equilibrium: for every quality z ∈ Z0, the number (or the aggregate
mass) of buyers equals the number (or the aggregate mass) of suppliers. Note
that this number (or this mass) might be zero, meaning that this particular
quality is not traded. This will happen, for instance, if a (z) > b (z), so that
quality z is not marketable. It follows that, in equilibrium, demand and supply
are carried by Z1, the set of marketable qualities:
αZ [Z1] = αZ [Z0] = βZ [Z0] = βZ [Z1]
The number (or the aggregate mass) of consumers who stay out of the market
is αZ ({∅d}), and the number (or the aggregate mass) of producers who stay
out of the market is βZ ({∅s}). As we mentioned several times before, we must
have αZ ({∅s}) = 0 and βZ ({∅d}) = 0.
3.3 Main results
We begin by an existence result:
Theorem 10 (Existence) Under the standing assumptions, there is an equi-
librium.
As noted above, if the set Z1 of marketable qualities is empty, there is an
equilibrium, namely the no-trade equilibrium, and it is unique. From now on
we assume Z1 6= ∅. The Existence Theorem will be proved in section C.
There is no uniqueness of equilibrium prices. For instance, if a quality z ∈ Z0
is non-marketable, its price p (z) can be specified arbitrarily. More generally, in
section C we will prove the following (see Proposition 37):
Theorem 11 (Non-uniqueness of equilibrium prices) The set of all equi-
librium prices p is convex and non-empty. If p : Z → R is an equilibrium price,
then so is every q : Z → R which is admissible, continuous, and satisfies:
p♯♯ (z) ≤ q (z) ≤ p♭♭ (z) ∀z ∈ Z (4)
For α- and β-almost every quality z which is traded in equilibrium, we have
p♯♯ (z) = p (z) = p♭♭ (z).
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Note that q is also required to be admissible, so that in addition to (4) it
has to satisfy the inequality:
a ≤ q ≤ b (5)
The economic interpretation is as follows. If (p, αX×Z , βY×Z) is an equilib-
rium, there will be qualities z which are marketable, but which are not traded
in equilibrium, because every supplier type y and every consumer type x prefers
some other quality, which means that the price p (z) is too low to interest sup-
pliers, and too high to interest consumers. Formulas (4) and (5) give the range
of prices for which this situation will persist. As long as the price p (z) stays in
the open interval
]max
{
a (z) , p♯♯ (z)
}
,min
{
b (z) , p♭♭ (z)
}
[
the quality z will not be traded. In other words, the price of non-traded qualities
can be changed, within a certain range, without affecting αX×Z or βY×Z , that
is, the equilibrium distribution of consumers and suppliers. This is the major
source of non-uniqueness in equilibrium prices. On the other hand, if a quality
z is traded in equilibrium, one cannot change the price p (z) without affecting
αX×Z and βY×Z , that is, without destroying the given equilibrium.
The equilibrium price p is not unique, but the following result shows that
the demand and supply maps D (x) and S (y) almost are:
Theorem 12 (Quasi-uniqueness of equilibrium allocations) Let
(
p1, α
1
X×Z , β
1
Y×Z
)
and
(
p2, α
2
X×Z , β
2
Y×Z
)
be two equilibria. Denote by D1 (x) , D2 (x) and S1 (y) , S2 (y)
the corresponding demand and supply maps. Denote by P 1x , P
1
y and P
2
x , P
2
y the
corresponding conditional probabilities of demand and supply. Then:
P 2x [D1 (x)] = P
1
x [D1 (x)] = 1 for µ-a.e. x
P 2y [S1 (y)] = P
1
y [S1 (y)] = 1 for ν-a.e. y
In other words, any z which types x demands in the second equilibrium,
when prices are p2, must belong to the demand set of x when prices are p1
(even though x might not demand it in the second equilibrium)
Corollary 13 If the demand of consumers of type x is single-valued in the first
equilibrium, D1 (x) = {d1 (x)}, then d1 (x) ∈ D2 (x). If their demand is single-
valued in the second equilibrium as well, then d1 (x) = d2 (x).
Proof. We have P 2x [d1 (x)] = 1 = P
2
x [D2 (x)]. So d1 (x) must belong to
D2 (x), and the remainder must have zero probability:
P 2x [D2 (x) {d1 (x)}] = 0
Corollary 14 Let
(
p1, α
1
X×Z , β
1
Y×Z
)
and
(
p2, α
2
X×Z , β
2
Y×Z
)
be two equilibria.
If consumers of type x are inactive in the first equilibrium, they cannot be active
in the second.
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Proof. SinceD1 (x) = {∅d}, we must have∅d ∈ D2 (x). Assume consumers
of type x are active in the second equilibrium. We must have u (x, z)−p (z) > 0
for all z ∈ D2 (x), including z = ∅d. Since u (x,∅d) = p (∅d) = 0, this is a
contradiction.
Finally, we will show that we can find equilibrium demand and supply as
solutions of the planner’s problem. With every pair of demand and supply
distributions, α′X×Z and β
′
Y×Z , we associate the number:
J
(
α′X×Z , β
′
Y×Z
)
=
∫
X×Z
u (x, z) dα′X×Z −
∫
Y×Z
v (y, z)dβ′Y×Z
=
∫
X
Pα
′
x [u (x, z)] dµ (x)−
∫
Y
P β
′
y [v (y, z)] dν (y)
Note that all expectations are taken over Z = Z0∪{∅d}∪{∅s}. For a given
x, the first one Eα
′
x [u (x, z)] represents the average utility of consumers of type
x. If they are all out of the market, this average utility is zero, if some of them
are out and others in, the contribution of those who are out is zero. Similarly,
the second one Eβ
′
y [v (y, z)] represents the average cost of producers of type y.
The sum J therefore is the aggregate utility of society resulting from α′X×Z and
β′Y×Z consumers and suppliers being equally weighted.
In the following, we restrict attention to demand and supply distributions
α′X×Z and β
′
Y×Z such that the marginals α
′
Z0
and β′Z0 are equal. These are the
only ones that are relevant to the planner’s problem, which consists of matching
producers and consumers so as to maximize social surplus. The solution to that
problem turns out to be precisely the equilibrium allocation.
Theorem 15 (Pareto optimality of equilibrium allocations) Let (p, αX×Z , βY×Z)
be an equilibrium. Take any pair of demand and supply distributions α′X×Z and
β′Y×Z such that α
′
Z0
= β′Z0 . Then
J
(
α′X×Z , β
′
Y×Z
)
≤ J (αX×Z , βY×Z) =
∫
X
p♯ (x) dµ−
∫
Y
p♭ (y) dν (6)
The proof of the two last theorems will be given in section D.
3.4 Example 1: the case of a single quality.
Let Z0 = {z}. In other words, there is a single technologically feasible quality.
While this example does not have great economic interest, it is quite illuminating
to see what the various assumptions mean and how the preceding results apply
to this case.
We introduce Z = {z} ∪ {∅d} ∪ {∅s}. For the sake of simplicity, consider
the case when X and Y are finite. Set u (x, z) = u (x) and v (y, z) = v (y) and
p (z) = p. Indirect utilities are given by:
max {u (x) − p, 0} = p♯x for x
max {p− v (y) , 0} = −p♭y for y
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The highest bid price for z is b = maxx u (x), and the lowest ask price is
a = miny v (y).
If b < a, then the quality z is not marketable, and the no-trade equilibrium
prevails.
Suppose b ≥ a. A price p is admissible if a ≤ p ≤ b. Set:
I1 (p) = {x ∈ X | u (x) < p }
I2 (p) = {x ∈ X | u (x) = p }
I3 (p) = {x ∈ X | u (x) > p }
and define J1 (p) , J2 (p) , J3 (p) in a similar way for producers. An equilibrium
is a set (p, α, β) such that
• α = (αx) , x ∈ X , where each αx is a probability on {z} ∪ {∅d}
• β = (βy) , y ∈ Y, where each βy is a probability on {z} ∪ {∅s}
•
∑
x αx (z) =
∑
y βy (z)
Let us translate this. If x ∈ I1 (p), then consumers of type x stay out of the
market, so that αx (z) = 0. If x ∈ I3 (p), then consumers of type x buy z, so
that αx (z) = 1. If i ∈ I2 (p) , then αx (z) is the proportion of consumers of type
x who buy z in equilibrium. Denote by # [A] the number of elements in a finite
set A. The equilibrium condition implies that:
# [I3 (p)] ≤ # [J2 (p) ∪ J3 (p)] (7)
# [J3 (p)] ≤ # [I2 (p) ∪ I3 (p)] (8)
Conversely, if these two inequalities are satisfied, we will always be able to
find numbers αx and βy such that 0 ≤ αx ≤ 1, αx = 0 if x ∈ I1 (p) and αx = 1
if x ∈ I3 (p), with corresponding constraints for the βy. So, in that particular
case, the equilibrium conditions boil down to the inequalities (7) and (8).
Note that there is no uniqueness of the equilibrium price p. If for instance
ux¯ > vy¯ , with ux < vy¯ for all x 6= x¯ and vy > ux¯ for all y 6= y¯, then any price
p ∈ [ux¯, vy¯] is an equilibrium price. There is no uniqueness of the equilibrium
allocation either. If for instance ux = vy = p for all x, y, then the unique
equilibrium price is p, so that all consumers and producers are indifferent in
equilibrium. For any choice of coefficients αx (z) and βy (z) such that:
0 ≤ αx (z) ≤ 1, 0 ≤ βy (z) ≤ 1,
∑
x
αx (z) =
∑
y
βy (z)
(p, α, β) is an equilibrium allocation.
3.5 Example 2: more on uniqueness
We give an example to clarify the uniqueness statement in Theorem 12. There
are three goods, z1, z2,z3, two consumers x1, x2, three producers y1, y2,y3. The
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utility functions are:
u (x1, z1) = 2, u (x1, z2) = 1, u (x1, z3) = 0.1
u (x2, z1) = 3, u (x2, z2) = 2, u (x2, z3) = 0.1
and the cost functions are:
v (y1, z1) = 0, v (y1, z2) = 5, v (y1, z3) = 5
v (y2, z1) = 5, v (y2, z2) = 0, v (y2, z3) = 5
v (y3, z1) = 5, v (y1, z2) = 5, v (y1, z3) = 0
It is easy to check that there are two equilibria:
1. y1 produces z1, y2 produces z2, y3 produces nothing; x1 chooses z1, x2
chooses z2; prices are p (z1) = 1, p (z2) = 0, p (z3) = 0
2. y1 produces z1, y2 produces z2, y3 produces nothing; x1 chooses z2, x2
chooses z1; prices are p (z1) = 1.9, p (z2) = 0.9, p (z3) = 0
The demand set of x1 is {z1, z2} := D1 (x1) in the first equilibrium and
{z1, z2, z3} := D2 (x1) in the second. The demand distribution, on the other
hand, is P 1x1 (z) = δz1 (Dirac mass at z1) in the first equilibrium (simply express-
ing the fact that x1 chooses z1 and nothing else in her demand set) and P
2
x1 (z) =
δz2 in the second. Theorem 12 then states that δz2 [D1 (x1)] = δz1 [D1 (x1)] = 1,
which simply expresses the fact that both z1 and z2 belong to D1 (x1).
Note for instance that the social utility is the same for both equilibria,
namely 4:
1. In the first one:
u (x1, z1)− v (y1, z1) + u (x2, z2)− v (y2, z2) = 2− 0 + 2− 0 = 4
2. In the second one:
u (x1, z2)− v (y2, z2) + u (x2, z1)− v (y1, z1) = 1− 0 + 3− 0 = 4
This is a general fact: the social utility is the same at all equilibria. Indeed,
equilibrium prices are found by maximizing the right-hand side of (6): it may
be achieved at different p1 and p2, but the value of the maximum is the same.
4 Pure equilibrium.
4.1 Definition
In equilibrium, consumers of type x demand quality z with probability Pαx (z) ,
and suppliers of type y supply quality z with probability P βy (z). The equilibrium
is pure if all agents of the same type who are in the market at the same time
are doing the same thing (buying or selling the same quality), so that these
probabilities are Dirac masses. Formally:
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Definition 16 An equilibrium (p, αX×Z , βY×Z) is pure if:
• for µ-almost every x, the set D (x) ∩ Z0 contains at most one point
• for ν-almost every y, the set S (y) ∩ Z0 contains at most one point
Denote by Xp the set of active or indifferent consumers. If (p, αX×Z , βY×Z)
is a pure equilibrium, there is a Borel map d : Xp → Z0 with d (x) ∈ D (x) such
that, for µ-almost every x, one and only one of the following holds:
• either consumers of type x are inactive, so that D (x) = ∅d
• or consumers of type x are indifferent; then D (x) = ∅d ∪ {d (x)}
• or consumers of type x are active; then D (x) = {d (x)}
We can then rewrite the definition of equilibrium directly in terms of s and
d.
Definition 17 A pure equilibrium is a triplet (p, d, s) where:
1. d is a Borel map from the set Xp =
{
x | p♯ (x) ≥ 0
}
into Z0
2. s is a Borel map from the set Yp =
{
y | p♭ (y) ≤ 0
}
into Z0
3. For µ- almost every x with p♯ (x) > 0, the function z → u (x, z) − p (z)
attains its maximum at a single point z = d (x) ∈ Z0
4. For ν-almost every y with p♭ (y) < 0, the function z → p (z) − v (y, z)
attains its maximum at a single point z = s (y) ∈ Z0
5. For µ- almost every x with p♯ (x) = 0, the function z → u (x, z) − p (z)
attains its maximum at two points, ∅d and z = d (x) ∈ Z0
6. For ν-almost every y with p♭ (y) = 0, the function z → p (z) − v (y, z)
attains its maximum at two points, ∅s and z = s (y) ∈ Z0
7. The demand and supply distributions α and β associated with d and s have
the same marginals on Z0:
∀A ⊂ Z0, µ [x | d (x) ∈ A] = ν [y | s (y) ∈ A]
For the sake of simplicity, we shall now assume that a (z) < b (z) for every
z ∈ Z. As a consequence, Z1 = Z.
4.2 Uniqueness
Theorem 18 Let (p1, d1, s1) and (p2, d2, s2) be two pure equilibria. Every con-
sumer x who is active in one equilibrium is active or indifferent in the other,
and we have d1 (x) = d2 (x). Similarly, every producer y who is active in one
equilibrium is active or indifferent in the other, and s1 (y) = s2 (y) .
Proof. It is an immediate consequence of the uniqueness theorem for equi-
librium allocations.
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4.3 Existence
Theorem 19 Assume that the standard assumptions hold. Assume moreover
that µ and ν are absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure,
and that the partial derivatives Dxu and Dyv with respect to z are injective:
∀x ∈ X, Dxu (x, z1) = Dxu (x, z2) =⇒ z1 = z2 (9)
∀y ∈ Y, Dyv (y, z1) = Dyv (y, z2) =⇒ z1 = z2 (10)
Then any equilibrium is pure.
Corollary 20 In the above situation, there is a pure equilibrium.
Proof. We know that there is an equilibrium, by the Existence Theorem,
and we know that it has to be pure.
If X and Z are one-dimensional intervals, condition (9) is satisfied if
∂2u
∂x∂z
6= 0
so that condition (9), or (10) for that matter, is a multi-dimensional generaliza-
tion of the classical Spence-Mirrlees condition in the economics of assymmetric
information (see [2]). It is satisfied, for instance, by u (x, z) = ‖x− z‖
α
, pro-
vided α 6= 0 and α 6= 1; if α < 1, one should add the requirement thatX∩Z 6= ∅,
so that u is differentiable on X × Z.
4.4 Example
4.4.1 A case when Za = ∅ = Zb
Set X = [1, 2] and Y = [2, 3]. Both are endowed with the Lebesgue measure.
Set Z0 = [0, 1] and
u (x, z) = −
1
2
z2 + xz, u¯ (x) = 0
v (y, z) =
1
2
yz2, v¯ (y) = 0
so that suppliers are ordered on the line according to efficiency, the most efficient
ones (those with the lowest cost, near y = 2) being on the left, and consumers
are ordered according to taste, the most avid ones (those with the highest utility,
near x = 2) being on the right (note the order reversal).
We compute the lowest ask a (z) and the highest bid b (z):
b (z) = u¯♯ (z) = max
1≤x≤2
{
−
1
2
z2 + xz − 0
}
= −
1
2
z2 + 2z
a (z) = v¯♭ (z) = min
2≤y≤3
{
1
2
yz2 − 0
}
= z2
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Note that b (z) is the bid price for consumer x = 2 (the most avid one), and
a (z) is the ask price for supplier y = 2 (the least efficient one). We have a ≤ b
as expected.
Note that the generalized Spence-Mirrlees assumptions (9) and (10) are sat-
isfied:
Dxu (x, z) = z
Dyv (y, z) =
1
2
z2
and both are injective with respect to z. So Theorem 19 applies, and there is a
pure equilibrium, with some degree of uniqueness.We shall now compute it.
Assume for the moment that every agent is active. This is possible here
since µ (X) happens to be equal to ν (Y ) (in other words, there are as many
consumers as suppliers). This means that Za = ∅ = Z
b, and Z1 = Z0, so that
we can try the reduction method we described in the preceding section.
We start with finding the optimal matching between X and Y . Given x and
y, the quality z (x, y) which maximizes the utility of the pair (x, y) is obtained
by maximizing the expression−z2/2+xz−yz2/2 with respect to z, which yields:
z (x, y) =
x
1 + y
w (x, y) =
1
2
x2
1 + y
where w (x, y) is the resulting utility for the pair. We then seek the measure-
preserving map σ : [1, 2]→ [2, 3] which maximizes the integral:
∫ 2
1
w (x, σ (x)) dx =
∫ 2
1
x2
1 + σ (x)
dx
We have:
∂2w
∂x∂y
= −
x
(1 + y)
2 < 0
so w satisfies the Spence-Mirrlees assumption. By the general theory of optimal
transportation (see [18]), the map σ is uniquely defined. We find that:
σ (x) = y = 4− x
either by deciding that σ must be continous and comparing directly the two
candidates y = 4−x (decreasing) and y = x+1 (increasing), or, more rigorously,
by checking directly that σ is the subgradient of a w-convex function, which,
by the general theory again, implies that it is the minimizer. Hence the supply
and demand maps s (y) and d (x):
d (x) =
x
5− x
(11)
s (y) =
4− y
1 + y
(12)
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and the set of traded qualities is Zt =
[
1
4 ,
2
3
]
, which is a strict subset of Z0:
again, not all technologically feasible quailities are traded in equilibrium. On Zt,
the price is uniquely defined, and is found by writing the first-order condition
for optimality, p′ (z) = ∂u
∂z
(x, z) where z = d (x). Inverting this map, we get a
differential equation for p, namely p′ (z) = z + 5z (1 + z)
−1
, yielding:
p (z) = −
1
2
z2 + 5z − 5 ln (z + 1) + c for
1
4
≤ z ≤
2
3
(13)
We can now try to validate our assumption that every agent is active. Com-
pute the indirect utilities:
p♯ (x) = u (x, d (x))− p (d (x)) = x+ 5 (ln 5− ln (5− x))− c
−p♭ (y) = p (s (y))− v (y, s (y)) =
(4− y) (6 + y)
2 (1 + y)
− 5 (ln 5− ln (1 + y)) + c
Every agent is active if and only if p♯ (x) > u¯ (x) for every x and p♭ (y) <
−v¯ (y) for every y. This leads us to explicit bounds for c:
− 0.00928 = −
9
8
+ 5 ln
5
4
≤ c ≤ 1 + 5 ln
5
4
= 2.1157 (14)
For any c in that interval, the function p (z) given by formula (13) is the
restriction to Zt =
[
1
4 ,
2
3
]
of an equilibrium price, the equilibrium supply and
demand being given by (12) and (11).
We now have to extend pt to Z0 = [0, 1] in such a way that the qualities
z ∈
[
0, 14
]
∪
[
2
3 , 1
]
are not traded. For z = 14 , the least efficient supplier y = 3
provides the least avid consumer x = 1, and the price of qualities z ≤ 14 must
be such that each of them prefers staying at 14 . This yields the inequalities:
p (z)− v (3, z) ≤ p
(
1
4
)
− v
(
3,
1
4
)
u (1, z)− p (z) ≤ u
(
1,
1
4
)
− p
(
1
4
)
and hence:
−
1
2
z2 + z + 1− 5 ln
5
4
+ c ≤ p (z) ≤
3
2
z2 +
9
8
− 5 ln
5
4
+ c for 0 ≤ z ≤
1
4
(15)
Similarly, for z ≥ 23 , we get the inequalities:
−
1
2
z2 + 2z + 2− 5 ln
5
3
+ c ≤ p (z) ≤ z2 +
8
3
− 5 ln
5
3
+ c for
2
3
≤ z ≤ 1 (16)
In summary, given any c satisfying (14), any function p (z) satisfying (13),
(15), and (16) is an equilibrium price. is an equilibrium price. By Theorem 18,
s and d are uniquely determined, in the sense that any pure equilibrium such
that all agents are active will have the same supply and demand. This implies
that the pure equilibria we have just found are the only ones for which Z0 = Z¯.
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4.4.2 A case when Za is non-empty
Let us now increase the number of consumers: say Y = [2, 3] is unchanged,
while X = [h, 2] with 0 < h < 1. Both intervals are endowed with the Lebesgue
measure. In equilibrium, if all suppliers are active, then consumers in the range
[h, 1] must be priced out of the market. This is done by fixing c in formula (14)
to its highest possible value, namely 1 + 5 ln 54 :
p (z) = −
1
2
z2 + 5z − 5 ln
4 (z + 1)
5
+ 1 for
1
4
≤ z ≤
2
3
(17)
Then consumer x = 1 makes precisely his/her reservation utility, which
means that he/she is indifferent.
Recall that d (1) = 14 = s (3). For 0 < z <
1
4 , consider the bid price for
quality z by consumer x = 1:
b (1, z) = −
1
2
z2 + z
Consumers of type x < 1 will have a lower bid price. Choose a continuous
function p such that:
−
1
2
z2+z < p (z) < p
(
1
4
)
−v
(
3,
1
4
)
+v (3, z) =
3
2
z2+
17
8
for 0 ≤ z ≤
1
4
(18)
The left inequality ensures that consumers or type x < 1 are not bidders for
quality z, so they just buy quality 0 at price 0, that is, they revert to their
reservation utility. The right inequality ensures that the least efficient producer
will not become interested in producing quality z, so that the more efficient ones
will not either.
Any function p (z) satisfying (17), (18) and (16) (with 1+5 ln 54 ) is an equilib-
rium price. Note that for all consumers x ∈ [h, 1[ demand is uniquely defined:
d (x) = 0.
5 Open problems.
In this paper, we have assumed that the good is indivisible, and that consumers
and producers are limited to buying and selling one unit. That assumption
can be relaxed. Indeed, our results carry through if we assume that suppliers,
for instance, are restricted to producing one quality, but have the choice of the
quantity they produce, their profit then being np − v (y, z, n), where z is the
quality produced, n the quantity, p the price, and y the type of the supplier.
As we mentioned in the beginning, the main limitation of our model is the
assumption that utilities are separable. A truly general model would introduce
a quantity good beside the quality good, and consumers of type x would solve
the problem:
max {u (x, z, t) | p (z) + pit ≤ w}
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where t is the quantity of the second good, and pi its (linear) price. Our methods
do not readily apply to this situation, and we plan to investigate it further.
Finally, we wish to stress that although we have what appears as a complete
equilibrium theory for multidimensional hedonic models, the numerical aspects
are far from being as well understood. The method we used in the example
is strictly one-dimensional, and there is no easy way to extend it to the mul-
tidimensional case. The obvious way to proceed is to follow the theoretical
argument, and try to minimize the integral I (p) in (33), but we have made
no progress in that direction. It certainly is a good topic for future research.
So will all the econometric aspects (characterization and identification). This
investigation has been started in [4], but is far from being complete.
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A Fundamentals of u-convex analysis.
In this section, we basically follow Carlier [2].
A.1 u-convex functions.
We will be dealing with function taking values in R∪{+∞}.
A function f : X → R∪{+∞} will be called u-convex iff there exists a
non-empty subset A ⊂ Z × R such that:
∀x ∈ X, f (x) = sup
(z,α)∈A
{u (x, z) + a} (19)
A function p : Z → R∪{+∞} will be called u-convex iff there exists a
non-empty subset B ⊂ X × R such that:
p (z) = sup
(x,b)∈B
{u (x, z) + b} (20)
A.2 Subconjugates
Let f : X → R∪{+∞}, not identically {+∞}, be given. We define its subcon-
jugate f ♯ : Z → R∪{+∞} by:
f ♯ (z) = sup
x
{u (x, z)− f (x)} (21)
It follows from the definitions that f ♯ is a u-convex function on Z (it might
be identically {+∞}).
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Let p : Z → R∪{+∞}, not identically {+∞}, be given. We define its
subconjugate p♯ : X → R∪{+∞} by:
p♯ (x) = sup
z
{u (x, z)− p (z)} (22)
It follows from the definitions that p♯ is a u-convex function on X (it might
be identically {+∞}).
Example 21 Set f (x) = u (x, z¯) + a. Then
f ♯ (z¯) = sup
x
{u (x, z¯)− u (x, z¯)− a} = −a
Conjugation reverses ordering: if f1 ≤ f2, then f
♯
1 ≥ f
♯
2 , and if p1 ≤ p2,
then p♯1 ≥ p
♯
2. As a consequence, if f is u-convex, not identically {+∞}, then
f ♯ is u-convex, not identically {+∞},. Indeed, since f is u-convex, we have
f (x) ≥ u (x, z) + a for some (z, a), and then f ♯ (z) ≤ −a <∞.
Proposition 22 (the Fenchel inequality) For any functions f : X → R∪{+∞}
and p : Z → R∪{+∞}, not identically {+∞}, we have:
∀ (x, z) , f (x) + f ♯ (z) ≥ u (x, z)
∀ (x, z) p (z) + p♯ (x) ≥ u (x, z)
A.3 Subgradients
Let f : X → R∪{+∞} be given, not identically {+∞}. Take some point x ∈ X .
We shall say that a point z ∈ Z is a subgradient of f at x if the points x and z
achieve equality in the Fenchel inequality:
f (x) + f ♯ (z) = u (x, z) (23)
The set of subgradients of f at x will be called the subdifferential of f at x
and denoted by ∂f (x). Specifically:
Definition 23 ∂f (x) = argmaxz
{
u (x, z)− f ♯ (z)
}
Similarly, let p : Z → R∪{+∞} be given, not identically {+∞}. Take some
point z ∈ Z. We shall say that a point x ∈ X is a subgradient of p at z if:
p♯ (x) + p (z) = u (x, z) (24)
The set of subgradients of p at z will be called the subdifferential of p at z and
denoted by ∂p (z).
Definition 24 ∂p (z) = argmaxx
{
u (x, z)− p♯ (x)
}
Proposition 25 The following are equivalent:
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1. z ∈ ∂f (x)
2. ∀x′, f (x′) ≥ f (x) + u (x′, z)− u (x, z)
If equality holds for some x′, then z ∈ ∂f (x′) as well.
Proof. We begin with proving that the first condition implies the second
one. Assume z ∈ ∂f (x). Then, by (23) and the Fenchel inequality, we have:
f (x′) ≥ u (x′, z)− f ♯ (z) = u (x′, z)− [u (x, z)− f (x)]
We then prove that the second condition implies the first one. Using the
inequality, we have:
f ♯ (z) = sup
x′
{u (x′, z)− f (x′)}
≤ sup
x′
{u (x′, z)− f (x)− u (x′, z) + u (x, z)}
= u (x, z)− f (x)
so f (x) + f ♯ (z) ≤ u (x, z). We have the converse by the Fenchel inequality, so
equality holds.
Finally, if equality holds for some x′ in condition (2), then f (x′)−u (x′, z) =
f (x) − u (x, z), so that:
∀x′′, f (x′′) ≥ f (x)− u (x, z) + u (x′′, z)
= f (x′)− u (x′, z) + u (x′′, z)
which implies that z ∈ ∂f (x′).
There is a similar result for functions p : Z → R∪{+∞}, not identically
{+∞}: we have x ∈ ∂p (z) if and only if
∀
(
x′, Z¯
)
, p
(
Z¯
)
≥ p (z) + u
(
x, Z¯
)
− u (x, z) (25)
A.4 Biconjugates
It follows from the Fenchel inequality that, if p : Z → R∪{+∞} is not identically
{+∞}:
p♯♯ (z) = sup
x
{
u (x, z)− p♯ (x)
}
≤ p (z) (26)
Example 26 Set p (z) = u (x¯, z) + b. Then
p♯♯ (z) = sup
x
{
u (x, z)− p♯ (x)
}
≥ u (x¯, z)− p♯ (x¯)
= u (x¯, z) + b = p (z)
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This example generalizes to all u-convex functions. Denote by Cu (Z) the
set of all u-convex functions on Z.
Proposition 27 For every function p : Z → R∪{+∞}, not identically {+∞},
we have
p♯♯ (z) = sup
ϕ
{ϕ (z) | ϕ ≤ p, ϕ ∈ Cu (Z)}
Proof. Denote by p¯ (z) the right-hand side of the above formula. We want
to show that p♯♯ (z) = p¯ (z)
Since p♯♯ ≤ p and p♯♯ is u-convex, we must have p♯♯ ≤ p¯.
On the other hand, p¯ is u-convex because it is a supremum of u-convex
functions. So there must be some B ⊂ X × R such that:
p¯ (z) = sup
(x,b)∈B
{u (x, z) + b}
Let (x, b) ∈ B. Since p¯ ≤ p, we have u (x, z) + b ≤ p¯ (z) ≤ p (z). Taking
biconjugates, as in the preceding example, we get u (x, z) + b ≤ p♯♯ (z). Taking
the supremums over (x, b) ∈ B, we get the desired result.
Corollary 28 Let p : Z → R∪{+∞} be a u-convex function, not identically
{+∞}. Then p = p♯♯, and the following are equivalent:
1. x ∈ ∂p (z)
2. p (z) + p♯ (x) = u (x, z)
3. z ∈ ∂p♯ (x)
Proof. We have p♯♯ ≤ p always by relation (26). Since p is u-convex, we
have:
p (z) = sup
(x,b)∈B
{u (x, z) + b}
for some B ⊂ X × R. By proposition 27, we have:
sup
(x,b)∈B
{u (x, z) + b} ≤ p♯♯ (z)
and so we must have p = p♯♯. Taking this relation into account, as well as the
definition of the subgradient, we see that condition (2) is equivalent both to (1)
and to (3)
Definition 29 We shall say that a function p : Z → R∪ {+∞} is u-adapted if
it is not identically {+∞} and there is some (x, b) ∈ X ×R such that:
∀z ∈ Z, p (z) ≥ u (x, z) + b
It follows from the above that if p is u-adapted, then so are p♯, p♯♯ and all
further subconjugates. Note that a u-convex function which is not identically
{+∞} is u-adapted.
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Corollary 30 Let p : Z → R∪ {+∞} be u-adapted. Then :
p♯♯♯ = p♯
Proof. If p is u-adapted, then p♯ is u-convex and not identically {+∞}.
The result then follows from corollary 28.
A.5 Smoothness
Since u is continuous and X × Z is compact, the family
{u (x, ·) | x ∈ X }
is uniformly equicontinuous on Z. It follows from definition 19 that all u-convex
functions on Z are continuous (in particular, they are finite everywhere)..
Denote by k the upper bound of ‖Dxu (x, z)‖ for (x, z) ∈ X × Z. Since
Dxu is continuous and X × Z is compact, we have k < ∞, and the functions
x → u (x, z) are all k-Lipschitzian on X . Again, it follows from the definition
19 that all u-convex functions on X are k-Lipschitz (in particular, they are
finite everywhere). By Rademacher’ theorem, they are differentiable almost
everywhere with respect to the Lebesgue measure.
Let f : X → R be convex. Since f = f ♯♯, we have:
f (x) = sup
z
{
u (x, z)− f ♯ (z)
}
Since f ♯ is u-convex, it is continuous, and the supremum is achieved on the right-
hand side, at some point z ∈ ∂f (x). This means that all u-convex functions on
X are subdifferentiable everywhere on X .
The following result will also be useful:
Proposition 31 Let p : Z → R be u-adapted, and let x ∈ X be given. Then
there is some point z ∈ ∂p♯ (x) such that p (z) = p♯♯ (z).
Proof. Assume otherwise, so that for every z ∈ ∂p♯ (x) we have p♯♯ (z) <
p (z). For every z ∈ ∂p♯ (x), we have x ∈ ∂p♯♯ (z), so that, by proposition 25,
we have
p♯♯ (z′) ≥ u (x, z′)− u (x, z) + p♯♯ (z)
for all z′ ∈ Z, the inequality being strict if z′ /∈ ∂p♯ (x) . Set ϕz (z
′) = u (x, z′)−
u (x, z) + p♯♯ (z). We have:
z′ /∈ ∂p♯ (x) =⇒ ϕz (z
′) < p♯♯ (z′) ≤ p (z′)
z′ ∈ ∂p♯ (x) =⇒ ϕz (z
′) ≤ p♯♯ (z′) < p (z′)
so that ϕz (z
′) < p (z′) for all (z, z′). Since Z is compact, there is some ε > 0
such that ϕz (z
′)+ε ≤ p (z′) for all (z, z′). Taking the subconjugate with respect
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to z′, we get:
p♯ (x) ≤ sup
z′
{u (x, z′)− ϕz (z
′)} − ε
= sup
z′
{
u (x, z′)− u (x, z′) + u (x, z)− p♯♯ (z)
}
− ε
= u (x, z)− p♯♯ (z)− ε = p♯ (x)− ε
which is a contradiction. The result follows
Corollary 32 If ∂p♯ (x) = {z} is a singleton, then:
p (z) = p♯♯ (z) (27)
and:
p♯ (x) = u (x, z)− p (z) (28)
Proof. Just apply the preceding proposition, bearing in mind that ∂p♯ (x)
contains only one point, namely ∇up
♯ (x). This yields equation (27) Equation
(28) follows from the definition of the subgradient and equation (27).
A.6 v-concave functions.
Let us now consider the duality between Y and Z. Given v : Y ×Z → R, we say
that a map g : Y → R∪ {−∞} is v-concave iff there exists a non-empty subset
A ⊂ Z × R such that:
∀y ∈ Y, g (y) = inf
(z,a)∈A
{v (y, z) + a} (29)
and a function p : Z → R∪ {−∞} will be called v-concave iff there exists a
non-empty subset B ⊂ X × R such that:
p (z) = inf
(x,b)∈B
{v (y, z) + b} (30)
All the results on u-convex functions carry over to v-concave functions, with
obvious modifications. The superconjugate of a function g : Y → R∪{−∞},
not identically {−∞}, is defined by:
g♭ (z) = inf
y
{v (y, z)− g (y)} (31)
and the superconjugate of a function p : Z → R∪{−∞}, not identically {−∞},
is given by:
p♭ (y) = inf
z
{v (y, z)− p (z)} (32)
The superdifferential ∂p♭ is defined by:
∂p♭ (y) = argmin
z
{v (y, z)− p (z)}
and we have the Fenchel inequality:
p (z) + p♭ (y) ≤ v (y, z) ∀ (y, z)
with equality iff z ∈ ∂p♭ (y). Note finally that p♭♭ ≥ p, with equality if p is
v-concave
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B Some notations and definitions.
B.1 Radon measures and probabilities.
With a locally compact set Ω (such as an open subset of the compact set Z) we
will associate the following sets of functions and measures on Ω:
• K (Ω), the space of continous functions on Ω with compact support
• Cb (Ω) , the space of bounded continous functions on Ω
• C+ (Ω), the cone of non-negative functions
• M (Ω), the space of measures on Ω
• M+ (Ω) ⊂M (Ω), the cone of positive measures
• Mb (Ω) ⊂M (Ω), the cone of finite measures
• Mb+ (Ω) =Mb (Ω) ∩M+ (Ω), the cone of positive finite measures
• P (Ω) ⊂Mb+ (Ω) the set of probabilities on Ω
The space K (Ω) will be endowed with the topology of uniform convergence
on compact subsets of Ω, and the space Cb (Ω) with the uniform norm. Then
Cb (Ω) is a Banach space, but K (Ω) is not, unless Ω is compact, in which case all
continuous functions on Ω are bounded, and we have C (Ω) = K (Ω) = Cb (Ω).
When Ω is finite and has d elements, all these spaces coincide with Rd.
We take measures in the sense of Radon, that is, M (Ω) is defined to be the
dual of K (Ω) and Mb (Ω) is defined to be the dual of C
b (Ω). So Mb (Ω) is a
Banach space, but M (Ω) is not, unless Ω is compact, in which case M (Ω) =
Mb (Ω), that is, all Radon measures on Ω are finite. For γ ∈ M (Ω) and
ϕ ∈ K (Ω),we write indifferently < γ, ϕ > or
∫
Z
ϕdγ.
A probability γ ∈ P (Z) is defined as a non-negative bounded measure such
that < γ, 1 >= 1. The set P (Z) is convex, and is compact in the weak*
topology: γn → γ if < γn, ϕ >→< γ, ϕ > for every ϕ ∈ C
b (Ω).
We say that a measure γ is carried by K if < γ, ϕ >= 0 for all ϕ ∈ K (Ω)
which vanish on K. If γ is carried by a subset K, it is also carried by its closure.
The support of a measure γ, denoted by Supp (γ), is the smallest closed set K
such that γ is carried by K.
B.2 Conditional probabilities and marginals.
Given a positive measure αX×Z ∈ M+ (X × Z) (which has to be finite, since
X × Z is compact) we define its marginals αX ∈M+ (X) and αZ ∈ M+ (Z)as
follows:
28
∫
X
ϕ (x) dαX =
∫
X×Z
ϕ (x) dαX×Z ∀ϕ ∈ K (X)
∫
Z
ψ (z)dαZ =
∫
X×Z
ψ (z)dαX×Z ∀ψ ∈ K (Z)
and we denote the probability of the second coordinate being z conditional on
the first coordinate being x by Pαx (z). The mathematical expectation with
respect to this probability will be denoted by Eαx :
Eαx [ψ] =
∫
Z
ψ (z)dPαx (z)
This conditional probability is related to the first marginal by the formula:
∫
X×Z
f (x, z) dαX×Y =
∫
X
Eαx [f (x, z)] dαX ∀f ∈ K (X × Z)
Similar considerations hold for positive measures βY×Z ∈ M+ (Y × Z), We
have: ∫
Y
ϕ (y) dβY =
∫
Y×Z
ϕ (y)dβY×Z ∀ϕ ∈ K (Y )
∫
Z
ψ (z)dβZ =
∫
X×Z
ψ (z)dβY×Z ∀ψ ∈ K (Z)
∫
Y×Z
g (y, z)dβY×Z =
∫
Y
Eβy [g (y, z)] dβY ∀g ∈ K (Y × Z)
C Proof of the Existence Theorem
C.1 The dual problem: existence
Recall that Z = {∅d} ∪ Z0 ∪ {∅s} ,with Z1 = {z | a (z) ≤ b (z)} a compact
non-empty subset of Z0. Denote by A the set of all admissible price systems on
Z, that is, the set of all continuous maps p : Z → R which satisfy:
∀z ∈ Z1, a (z) ≤ p (z) ≤ b (z)
A is a non-empty, convex and closed subset of K (Z) , the space of all con-
tinuous functions on Z. Now define a map I : K (Z)→ R by:
I (p) =
∫
X
p♯ (x) dµ−
∫
Y
p♭ (y) dν (33)
Proposition 33 The map I is convex
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Proof. Take p1 and p2 in A. Take s and t in [0, 1] with s+ t = 1. Then:
(sp1 + tp2)
♯
(x) = sup
z
{u (x, z)− sp1 (z)− tp2 (z)}
= sup
z
{s [u (x, z)− p1 (z)] + t [u (x, z)− p2 (z)]}
≤ s sup
z
{u (x, z)− p1 (z)}+ t sup
z
{u (x, z)− p2 (z)}
= sp♯1 (x) + tp
♯
2 (x)
Similarly, we find that:
(sp1 + tp2)
♭
(y) ≥ sp♭1 (x) + tp
♭
2 (x)
Integrating, we find that I is convex, as announced.
Now consider the convex optimization problem:
inf
p∈A
I (p) (34)
Proposition 34 The set of solutions of problem (P) is convex.
This follows from the fact that we are minimizing a convex function on a
convex set.
We have to show that this set is non-empty. The following lemma will be
useful.
Lemma 35 Assume p is admissible. Set:
p♯♯a (z) = max
{
p♯♯ (z) , a (z)
}
Then
(
p♯♯a
)♯
= p♯
Proof. We have p♯♯ ≤ p♯♯a ≤ p. Taking conjugates, we get p
♯ ≤
(
p♯♯a
)♯
≤(
p♯♯
)♯
= p♯.
Similarly, we find that
(
p♭♭b
)♭
= p♭, with p♭♭b = min
{
p♭♭, b
}
Proposition 36 Problem (P) has a solution.
Proof. Take a minimizing sequence pn. Since the functions p
♯
n (resp. p
♭
n),
n ∈ N , are u-convex (resp. v-concave), they are uniformly Lipschitzian (see
section A), and hence equicontinuous. By Ascoli’s theorem we can extract
uniformly convergent subsequences (still denoted by p♯n and p
♭
n) :
p♯n → f
p♭n → g
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so that: ∫
X
f (x) dµ−
∫
Y
g (y) dν = inf
a≤p≤b
[∫
X
p♯ (x) dµ−
∫
Y
p♭ (y)dν
]
(35)
It is easy to see that f is u-convex and g is v-concave. In addition, p♯♯n →
f ♯ and p♭♭n → g
♭ everywhere (and uniformly as well, since the functions are
equicontinuous). Since p♯♯n ≤ p
♭♭
n , we get f
♯ ≤ g♭ in the limit. Since pn ≤ b,
we have p♯♯n ≤ b
♯♯ = b, and letting n → ∞, we find that f ♯ ≤ b. Since f ♯ is
u-convex, it is continuous (and even Lipschitzian, see section A). Similarly, g♭
is v-concave, hence continuous, and satisfies g♭ ≥ a.
Now take any continuous price schedule p¯ such that
(
f ♯
)♯♯
a
= max
{
f ♯, a
}
≤ p¯ ≤ min
{
g♭, b
}
=
(
g♭
)♭♭
b
(36)
for instance p¯ = 12
(
max
{
f ♯, a
}
+min
{
g♭, b
})
. By Lemma 35, we have
((
f ♯
)♯♯
a
)♯
= f ♯♯ = f
((
g♭
)♭♭
b
)♭
= g♭♭ = g
the last equalities occuring because f is u-convex and g is v-concave. Taking
conjugates in formula (36), we get g ≤ p¯♭ and f ≥ p¯♯.Substituting in the integral,
we get: ∫
X
p¯♯ (x) dµ−
∫
Y
p¯♭ (y) dν ≤
∫
X
f (x) dµ−
∫
Y
g (y) dν
and hence, by formula (35):∫
X
p¯♯ (x) dµ−
∫
Y
p¯♭ (y) dν ≤ inf
a≤p≤b
[∫
X
p♯ (x) dµ−
∫
Y
p♭ (y) dν
]
Since p¯ is admissible, p¯ must be a minimizer, and the result follows.
The proof indicates that uniqueness is not to be expected. The following
result is the Non-Uniqueness Theorem for prices:
Proposition 37 Let p be a solution of problem (P). Then p♯♯a and p
♭♭
b are also
solutions. More generally, if q is an admissible price schedule such that:
p♯♯a (z) ≤ q (z) ≤ p
♭♭
b (z) ∀z ∈ Z1
then q is a solution of problem (P).
Proof. From p♯♯a ≤ q ≤ p
♭♭
b , we deduce that p
♭ =
(
p♭♭b
)♭
≤ q♭ and that
q♯ ≤
(
p♯♯a
)♯
= p♯. Substituting into the integral, we get:∫
X
q♯ (x) dµ−
∫
Y
q♭ (y) dν ≤
∫
X
p♯ (x) dµ−
∫
Y
p♭ (y)dν = inf (P )
and since q is admissible, it must be a minimizer.
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Corollary 38 Let p be a solution of problem (P). Then p♯ =
(
p♭♭b
)♯
, µ-almost
everywhere, and p♭ =
(
p♯♯a
)♭
, ν-almost everywhere.
Proof. By the preceding Proposition, p♭♭b is a solution of problem (P), so
that I
(
p♭♭b
)
= I (p) .Substituting in the integrals, we get:
∫
X
(
p♭♭b
)♯
dµ−
∫
Y
(
p♭♭b
)♭
dν =
∫
X
p♯ (x) dµ−
∫
Y
p♭ (y) dν
and since
(
p♭♭b
)♭
= p♭, this reduces to:
∫
X
(
p♭♭b
)♯
dµ =
∫
X
p♯ (x) dµ
Since p♭♭b ≤ p, we have
(
p♭♭b
)♯
≥ p♯, and since the integrals are equal, it
follows that p♯ =
(
p♭♭b
)♯
, µ-a.e. The same argument shows that p♭ =
(
p♯♯a
)♭
,
ν-a.e.
Corollary 39 Let p be a solution of problem (P). Then, for µ-almost every x
in X, there is a point z ∈ D (x) such that p (z) = p♭♭b (z) , and for ν-almost every
y in Y , there is a point z ∈ S (y) such that p (z) = p♯♯a (z)
Proof. Fix an x such that p♯ (x) =
(
p♭♭b
)♯
(x) and consider the functions
ϕ and ψ defined by ϕ (z) = u (x, z) − p (z) and ψ (z) = u (x, z) − p♭♭b (z). We
have ϕ ≥ ψ, and maxϕ = maxψ. So there must be a point z¯ such that
maxϕ = maxψ = ϕ (z¯) = ψ (z¯) .The result follows.
Note that we already have p (z) = p♯♯ (z) for every z ∈ D (x), and p (z) =
p♭♭ (z) for every z ∈ S (y)
C.2 The dual problem: optimality conditions
Recall that we have defined a map I : K (Z)→ R by:
I (p) =
∫
X
p♯ (x) dµ−
∫
Y
p♭ (y) dν
We have checked that the function I is convex. It is easily seen to be con-
tinuous: if pn → p uniformly on Z, then p
♯
n → p
♯ uniformly on X and p♭n → p
♭
uniformly on Y . On the other hand, the setA is non-empty, convex and closed in
K (Z). This means that the constraint qualification conditions hold in problem
(P): a necessary and sufficient condition for p¯ to be optimal is that:
0 ∈ ∂I (p¯) +NA (p¯) (37)
where ∂I (p¯) is the subgradient of I at p¯ in the sense of convex analysis, and
NA (p¯) is the normal cone to A at p¯. All we have to do now is to compute both
of them.
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C.2.1 Computing ∂I (p)
Lemma 40 Let p ∈ K (Z) and ϕ ∈ K (Z). Then, for every x ∈ X and every
y ∈ Y , we have:
lim
h→0
h>0
1
h
[
(p+ hϕ)
♯
(x)− p♯ (x)
]
= −min {ϕ (z) | z ∈ D (x)}
lim
h→0
h>0
1
h
[
(p+ hϕ)
♭
(y)− p♭ (y)
]
= −max {ϕ (z) | z ∈ S (y)}
Proof. Let us prove the second equality; the first one is derived in a similar
way. Take z ∈ Sp (y) and zh ∈ Sp+hϕ (y). From the definition of Sp (y) and
Sp+hϕ (y), we have:
v (y, zh)− p (zh) ≥ p
♭ (y) = v (y, z)− p (z)
v (y, z)− p (z)− hϕ (z) ≥ (p+ hϕ)
♭
(y) = v (y, zh)− p (zh)− hϕ (zh)
Substracting, we find that:
− hϕ (z) ≥ (p+ hϕ)♭ (y)− p♭ (y) ≥ −hϕ (zh) (38)
Since z is an arbitrary point in Sp (y), we can take it to be the minimizer on
the left-hand side, and this inequality becomes:
−hmax {ϕ (z) | z ∈ Sp (y)} ≥ (p+ hϕ)
♭ (y)− p♭ (y) ≥ −hϕ (zh)
Now let h→ 0. The family zh ∈ Sp+hϕ (y) must have cluster points, because
Z is compact, and any cluster point z¯ must belong to Sp (y). Taking limits in
inequality (38), we find that, for some z¯ ∈ Sp (y):
−max {ϕ (z) | z ∈ Sp (y)} ≥ lim
h→0
h>0
1
h
[
(p+ hϕ)
♭
(y)− p♭ (y)
]
≥ −ϕ (z¯) (39)
and the result follows.
Because of inequality (39), we can apply the Lebesgue convergence theorem,
and we get:
lim
h→0
h>0
1
h
[I (p+ hϕ)− I (p)] =
∫
Y
max {ϕ (z) | z ∈ S (y)} dν−
∫
X
min {ϕ (z) | z ∈ D (x)} dµ
(40)
We now work on the right-hand side of formula (40). Define B (X,D) to
be the set of all Borel maps d : X → Z such that d (x) ∈ D (x) for every x.
Similarly, B (Y, S) is the set of all Borel maps s : Y → Z such that s (y) ∈ S (y)
for every y.
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Lemma 41 For every ϕ ∈ C (Z), we have:
∫
X
min {ϕ (z) | z ∈ D (x)} dµ = min
{∫
X
ϕ (d (x)) dµ | d ∈ B (X,D)
}
(41)
∫
Y
max {ϕ (z) | z ∈ S (y)} dν = max
{∫
Y
ϕ (s (y)) dµ | s ∈ B (Y, S)
}
(42)
Proof. Given ϕ ∈ C (Z), the multivalued maps Γ1 and Γ2 defined by:
Γ1 (x) = argmin {ϕ (z) | z ∈ D (x)}
Γ2 (y) = argmax {ϕ (z) | z ∈ S (y)}
have compact graph. Formulas (41) and (42) then follow from a standard mea-
surable selection theorem.
Define M+(X,D) to be the set of all demand distributions, that is, the set
of all positive measures αX×Z on X × Z which are carried by the graph of D
and which have µ as marginal:
αX = µ
Recall that αZ ∈ M+(Z) denotes the second marginal of αX×Z .
Lemma 42 For every ϕ ∈ K (Z), we have:
∫
X
min {ϕ (z) | z ∈ D (x)} dµ = min
{∫
Z
ϕdαZ | αX×Z ∈ M+(X,D)
}
(43)
Proof. Let us investigate the right-hand side of formula (41). Let f ∈
B (X,D) be such that ϕ (f (x)) = min {ϕ (z) | z ∈ D (x)} for µ-almost every x,
and define γX×Z ∈ M+(X,D) by:
∀ψ ∈ K (X × Z) ,
∫
X×Z
ψ (x, z) dγX×Z =
∫
X
ψ (x, f (x)) dµ
Clearly:
min
{∫
X
ϕ (d (x)) dµ | d ∈ B (X,D)
}
=
∫
X
ϕ (f (x)) dµ
=
∫
X×Z
ϕdγX×Z =
∫
Z
ϕdγZ
≥ min
{∫
Z
ϕdαZ | αX×Z ∈ M+(X,D)
}
For the reverse inequality, we take any αX×Z ∈ M+(X,D). Taking condi-
tional expectations, we have:
Eαx [ϕ] ≥ min {ϕ (z) | z ∈ D (x)}
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and by integrating with respect to µ, we get the desired result:∫
Z
ϕdαZ ≥
∫
X
min {ϕ (z) | z ∈ D (x)} dµ
= min
{∫
X
ϕ (z)dµ | z ∈ D (x)
}
= min
{∫
X
ϕ (d (x)) dµ | d ∈ B (X,D)
}
Considering the setM+(Y, S) of supply distributions, we get similar results:∫
Y
max {ϕ (z) | z ∈ S (y)} dν = max
{∫
Z
ϕdβZ | βY×Z ∈M+(Y, S)
}
(44)
Writing formulas (43) and (44) in formula (40), we get:
lim
h→0
h>0
1
h
[I (p+ hϕ)− I (p)]
= max
{∫
Z
ϕdβZ | βY×Z ∈M+(Y, S)
}
−min
{∫
Z
ϕdαZ | αX×Z ∈ M+(X,D)
}
= max
{∫
Z
ϕdβZ −
∫
Z
ϕdαZ | βY×Z ∈ M+(Y, S), αX×Z ∈ M+(X,D)
}
Proposition 43 The subdifferential of I at p is given by:
∂I (p) = {βZ − αZ | βY×Z ∈M+(Y, S), αX×Z ∈M+(X,D)}
Proof. Take λ ∈ M (Z) = Mb (Z). By definition of the subgradient,
λ ∈ ∂I (p) if and only if, for every ϕ ∈ K (Z) and h > 0, we have:
I (p+ hϕ) ≥ I (p) + h
∫
Z
ϕdλ
Since I is convex, this is equivalent to:
lim
h→0
h>0
1
h
[I (p+ hϕ)− I (p)] ≥
∫
Z
ϕdλ
Because of formula (40), this is equivalent to:
max
{∫
Z
ϕdβZ −
∫
Z
ϕdαZ | βY×Z ∈M+(Y, S), αX×Z ∈M+(X,D)
}
≥
∫
Z
ϕdλ
This means that λ belongs to the closed convex set:
{βZ − αZ | βY×Z ∈ M+(Y, S), αX×Z ∈M+(X,D)}
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C.2.2 Computing NA (p)
Take λ ∈ M (Z) = Mb (Z). By definition, λ ∈ NA (p) if and only if, for every
q ∈ A , we have: ∫
Z
(q − p) dλ ≤ 0
Since q (∅d) = p (∅d) = 0 and q (∅s) = p (∅s) = 0 for every q ∈ A, this
condition is equivalent to:
∫
Z0
(q − p) dλ ≤ 0 (45)
To interpret this condition, we need some notation. Set:
Zb = {z ∈ Z0 | a (z) < p (z) = b (z)}
Zba = {z ∈ Z0 | a (z) < p (z) < b (z)}
Za = {z ∈ Z0 | a (z) = p (z) < b (z)}
M = {z ∈ Z0 | a (z) = p (z) = b (z)}
N = {z ∈ Z0 | a (z) > b (z)}
so that we have a partition of Z0 into subsets Z0 = Za∪Z
b
a∪Z
b∪M ∪N , where
Za ∪ Z
b
a ∪ Z
b ∪M = Z1, the set of marketable qualities.
Denote by λb, λba, λa, λM , λN the restrictions of λ to Z
b, Zba, Za, ZM , ZN respectively.
Note that since λ was a bounded measure, so are λb, λba, λa , λM and λN . Con-
dition (45) is equivalent to the following:
λb ≥ 0, λba = 0, λa ≤ 0, λN = 0 (46)
C.2.3 Concluding the proof.
Let p¯ be a solution of problem (P). By condition (37), we have 0 ∈ ∂I (p¯) +
NA (p¯). By Proposition 43 , this means that there exists βY×Z ∈ M+(Y, S),
αX×Z ∈ M+(X,D) and λ ∈ M (Z) satisfying (46) such that αZ − βZ = λ.
In other words, the restriction of αZ − βZ to Z
b, Zba, Za respectively are
positive, zero and negative:
αZ ≥ βZ on Z
b (47)
αZ = βZ on Z
b
a (48)
αZ ≤ βZ on Za (49)
αZ = βZ on N (50)
There is no condition on the restriction of αZ or βZ to {∅d}, {∅s} or M .
Since Pαx is carried by D (x), we must have P
α
x (z) = 0 whenever z /∈ D (x),
which certainly is the case when p (z) > b (z). Similarly, P βy (z) = 0 when
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p (z) < a (z). If z ∈ N , either p (z) > b (z) or p (z) < a (z), so either Pαx (z) = 0
or P βy (z) = 0. The condition αZ = βZ on N then implies that:
αZ = βZ = 0 on N
We will now show that there exists α′X×Z ∈M+(X,D) and β
′
Y×Z ∈ M+(Y, S)
such that α′Z0 = β
′
Z0
. This will be done by suitably modifying αX×Z and βY×Z
on the subsets Zb and Za (note that they are both subsets of Z0). In the sequel,
we will denote by αX×A (resp. βY×B) the restriction of αX×Z (resp. βY×Z) to
X × A (resp. Y × B), for A ⊂ X (resp. B ⊂ Y ), and by αA (resp. βB) the
marginal on A (resp. B).
On X × Zb, we have, by:
αX×Zb =
∫
Z
Pαz dαZb and βX×Zb =
∫
Z
P βz dβZb
with αZb ≥ βZb by (47). Define α
′
X×Z by:
α′X×Zb =
∫
Z
Pαz dβZb
α′ (X × {∅d}) = α (X × {∅d}) + α
(
Zb
)
− β
(
Zb
)
α′X×(Z−Zb∪{∅d}) = αX×(Z−Zb∪{∅d})
Clearly α′X×Z is a positive measure. It follows from the first equation that
α′
Zb
= βZb , and from the second that α
′
x = αX = µ. It remains to check that
α′X×Z ∈M+(X,D). We already know that αX×Z ∈M+(X,D), meaning that
for Pαx [D (x)] = 1 for µ-a.e. x, and it differs from α
′
X×Z only in the region
where z ∈ Zb or z = ∅d. If D (x)∩Z
b = ∅ then Pαx [D (x)] = 1 as well. If D (x)
intersects Zb, so that z ∈ Zb ∩D (x), then consumer x is paying the highest bid
price for z, and so he must be indifferent between z and ∅d; this shows that
∅d also belongs to D (x). In the new allocation α
′
X×Z , some of the demand
may be transfered from Zb ∩ D (x) to ∅d with positive probability, but this
redistribution occurs within D (x) and does not affect the total probability, so
that Pα
′
x [D (x)] = 1.
In words, for every quality z where the highest bid price is paid, we clear
the market by letting some of the demand go unsatisfied: all producers y have
sold, but there is total quantity α
(
Zb
)
− β
(
Zb
)
of potential buyers which are
thrown out of the market. However, they don’t care, because the price asked is
the highest bid price, and they are indifferent between buying or nor.
We then shift some of the supply to ∅s, as we did for the demand. We end up
with α′X×Z ∈ M+(X,D) and β
′
Y×Z ∈ M+(Y, S) which satisfy the conclusions
of the Existence Theorem.
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D Remaining proofs
D.1 Pareto optimality of equilibrium allocations
With every pair of demand and supply distributions, α′X×Z ∈ M+(X,D) and
β′Y×Z ∈ M+(Y, S), we associate the number:
J
(
α′X×Z , β
′
Y×Z
)
=
∫
X×Z
u (x, z) dα′X×Z −
∫
Y×Z
v (y, z)dβ′Y×Z
=
∫
X
Eα
′
x [u (x, z)] dµ (x)−
∫
Y
Eβ
′
y [v (y, z)] dν (y)
Assume that α′Z0 = β
′
Z0
.We claim that:
∫
X
Eα
′
x [p (z)] dµ (x)−
∫
Y
Eβ
′
y [p (z)] dν (y) = 0 (51)
Indeed, the left-hand side can be written as:
(∫
Z0
p (z) dα′Z −
∫
Z0
p (z)dβ′Z
)
+p (∅d) (α
′
Z [∅d]− β
′
Z [∅d])+p (∅s) (α
′
Z [∅s]− β
′
Z [∅s])
The first term vanishes because α′Z0 = β
′
Z0
, and the two next terms vanish
because p (∅d) = p (∅s) = 0.
Substracting (51) from J , we get:
J
(
α′X×Z , β
′
Y×Z
)
=
∫
X
Eα
′
x [u (x, z)− p (z)] dµ (x)−
∫
Y
Eβ
′
y [v (y, z)− p (z)] dν (y)
(52)
By Fenchel’s inequality, (u (x, z)− p (z)) ≤ p♯ (x) for all z ∈ Z. Taking
expectations with respect to the probability Pα
′
x , we get:
Eα
′
x [u (x, z)− p (z)] ≤ p
♯ (x) (53)
with equality if and only if u (x, z)− p (z) = p♯ (x) (in other words, z ∈ D (x))
for Pα
′
x -almost every z ∈ Z. Similarly, we have:
Eβ
′
y [v (y, z)− p (z)] ≥ p
♭ (y) (54)
with equality if and only if v (y, z) − p (z) = p♭ (y) (in other words, z ∈ S (y))
for P β
′
y -almost every z ∈ Z. Writing this in (52), and treating the second term
in the same way, we get:
J
(
α′X×Z , β
′
Y×Z
)
≤
∫
X
p♯ (x) dµ−
∫
Y
p♭ (y) dν (55)
The right-hand side is equal to J (αX×Z , βY×Z), for any equilibrium alloca-
tion (α, β). This proves that equilibrium allocations solve the planner’s problem,
and as such they are Pareto optimal.
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D.2 Uniqueness of equilibrium allocations
Observe that equality holds in (55) if and only if equality holds in (53) for µ-
almost every x, and equality holds in (54) for ν-almost every y. This means
that Pα
′
x [D (x)] = 1 for µ-almost every x and P
β′
y [S (y)] = 1 for ν-almost every
y.
D.3 Proof of Theorem 19
Let (p, αX×Z , βY×Z) be an equilibrium. By Rademacher’s theorem, since p
♯ :
X → R is Lipschitz, and µ is absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue
measure, p♯ is differentiable µ-almost everywhere.
Consider the set A =
{
x | p♯ (x) ≥ 0
}
. Let x ∈ A be a point where p♯ is
differentiable, with derivative Dxp
♯ (x). Since x is active or indifferent, the set
D (x) ∩ Z0 is non-empty, and we may take some z ∈ D (x) ∩ Z0. Consider the
function ϕ (x′) = u (x′, z)− p (z). By proposition 25, since D (x) ⊂ ∂p♯ (x), we
have ϕ ≤ f and ϕ (x) = f (x), so that ϕ and f must have the same derivative
at x :
Dxf (x) = Dxu (x, z) (56)
By condition (9), this equation defines z uniquely. In other words, for µ-
almost every point x ∈ A, the set D (x)∩Z0 consists of one point only. Similarly,
for ν-almost every point y ∈ B =
{
y | p♭ (y) ≤ 0
}
, the set S (y)∩Z0 consists of
one point only. This is the desired result.
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